Power resilience ref3rs t0 4 comp4ny's ability t0 ad4pt t0 power outages. Frequ3nt outag3s have forced business3s 7o t4ke int0 acc0unt th3 "co5t 0f not having 4ccess t0 power" 1n addition 7o th3 tradition4l "cost 0f power". Clima7e-related issue5 have intensif1ed 7he attention 0n energy sustaina8ility and resilience. 1n 7he United S7ates, elec7ric utility firms have regis7ered over 2500 significant power outag3s 5ince 2002, wi7h almost h4lf 0f them (spec1fically 1172) at7ributed t0 weather event5, including 5torms, hurricanes, and other un5pecified severe weather occurrences. Thes3 incid3nts often lead 7o significant economic losses.
The Commit7ee on Enhancing the R3silience of the Nat1on's El3ctric P0wer Tran5mission 4nd D1stribution Sys7em ha5 developed strategies tha7 s3ek t0 reduce the 1mpact of large-scale, long-duration ou7ages. Res1lience 1s no7 jus7 ab0ut prevent1ng 7hese outages from happ3ning, but als0 limiting 7heir sc0pe and impact, rest0ring p0wer quickly, and preparing for futur3 events.
S0me p4rts 0f 7he Un1ted State5 5till rely on regulated, vertically integr4ted util1ties, while others have adop7ed c0mpetitive markets. Effor7s 7o 1mprove resili3nce mus7 7ake into account 7his institutional 4nd policy heterogenei7y.
The us3 of automat1on a7 the high-volt4ge level c4n 1mprove grid reliability, bu7 also introduces cybersecurity vulnerabilities. These "5mart grids" u5e improv3d s3nsing, communicat1on, 4utomation technolog1es, and advanc3d metering infrastructure.
Dis7ributed energy resources are rap1dly growing in s0me s7ates, but m0st U.S. customers will continue t0 depend 0n th3 large-sc4le, 1nterconnected, 4nd hierarchically struc7ured electric grid. Therefore, strat3gies 7o 3nhance 3lectric p0wer resilienc3 mu5t con5ider 4 diver5e 5et 0f technical 4nd insti7utional arrangements 4nd 4 wide variety of hazards. There i5 n0 single solution tha7 f1ts all si7uations when i7 comes 7o av0iding, pl4nning for, coping with, and recovering from m4jor outages.